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Introduction

Managerial discretion is the latitude of action afforded to a manager. This literature, classically focused
at the executive level, reconciles population ecology’s assertion that executives ultimately have little
influence over firm-level outcomes and strategic choice theory’s assertion that executives make
strategic decisions and thus have considerable influence over firm-level outcomes. Though generally
viewed in the management literature as an opportunity for executives to positively affect performance
and increase value, the literature in finance and economics argues that managerial discretion
represents a cost to shareholders from potential opportunism or other self-serving behaviors. Within
the management literature, scholars posit three categories (i.e., forces) that constrain or enable
executives: (1) the task environment (i.e., industry-level factors), (2) the internal organization (i.e.,
firm-level factors), and (3) managerial characteristics (i.e., individual-level factors). Recently, a fourth
category, national institutions (i.e., country-level factors), was added to the managerial discretion
model. While the managerial discretion literature has typically focused on upper echelons, scholars are

increasing their examination of mid-level managers’ discretion since many of the construct’s enabling
and constraining factors are also relevant for managers who are subordinate to senior executives. The
potential for issue selling and strategic planning activities by mid-level managers to influence
executives’ perceived discretion is an example of phenomena studied by scholars attempting to
improve our understanding of discretion afforded to mid-level managers.

Historical and Theoretical Foundation

While Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987 developed the seminal managerial discretion model employed by
management scholars, the concept was considered by management theorists for many years prior to
their model’s publication. March and Simon 1958 argued that executives engage in rational human
choice and that, because of executives’ limited cognitive capacities relative to the complexities of the
problems faced by individuals and organizations, simplifying processes are required to capture the
main features of problems facing their organizations. Additionally, executives’ bounded rationality and
aspiration levels, combined with implications of organizations existing as social institutions, influence
executives’ decisions and their organizations’ actions. Thompson 1967 argues that executives may be
constrained by powerful external forces, narrowing the range of options they can legitimately pursue,
while Pfeffer 1977 argues that executive behavior is subject to pressures to conform to the
expectations of peers, subordinates, and superiors. These works laid the foundation for the managerial
discretion model and its primary argument—that executive decision-making is enabled and
constrained by a variety of forces. Thus, Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987 posits that managerial
discretion acts as a conduit between two opposing organizational theories: population ecology and
strategic choice. Supporting population ecology, Hannan and Freeman 1977 contends that
organizations are inertial and are limited by internal and external pressures. Executives are constrained
by organizational rigidities, including nontransferable assets, sunk costs, firm age and history, and
power dynamics. Hannan and Freeman 1984 expands on this position by arguing that firms are
structurally inertial because of isomorphic adaptation to their environment. Population ecologists
conclude that executives matter very little, since it is rare that they succeed in making substantial
strategic or structural changes. Child 1972, however, argues that managers have agency and choose
strategies that shape organizational outcomes. Scholars such as Child, who support the strategic choice
perspective, argue that executives matter a great deal because they determine long-term goals and
objectives and can initiate courses of action (e.g., strategic change, diversification, acquisitions, and
divestitures) to pursue their organizations’ missions and objectives. Extending this logic to the
environment in which firms operate, strategic choice theory suggests that decisions are made through
internal and external relationships and involve pro-action as well as reaction. Indeed, Child
1972 postulates that executives, as well as others within a dominant coalition, can make a “strategic
choice” to implement structural change, determine the industry or market segment where their firms
compete, and alter performance standards.
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